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HOW FAR IS A PERSON PROTECTED BY THE
COURTS IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS VOCA-
TION OTHERWISE THAN BY REMEDIES
FOR ACTUAL OR THREATENED BREACH
OF CONTRACT OR VIOLENCE?*
Within the last hundred years, perhaps no other branch of the
law has brought forth a greater number of important and interesting
* This article was awarded the prize offered each year for the best thesis
submitted by a member of the Senior Class. The article is reproduced without
addition or correction.
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decisions by the courts than that dealing with labor organizations and
labor issues. The mass of litigation and the perplexity of the ques-
tions that have arisen on this subject are undoubtedly due to the
miraculous changes that have taken place in the industrial world with-
in the last century. But a comparatively short time ago, the bulk of
the country's business was done with crude machines in small shops,
where the master worked in close communion with his few journey-
men and apprentices. Under these conditions no great injustice was
likely to result either to employer or employee. Today, however,
the advent of the steam engine and other wonder-working machinery
has revolutionized methods of manufacturing, and has led to the
growth of factories undreamed of in size and capacity for production,
employing thousands of workmen, where the employer seldom gets
to know who his employees are, much less learns to know or appre-
ciate their grievances.
The bitter struggle between capital and labor is but one of the
eternal conflicts of which life is made up. It is but one of the results
of the attempt of each man to get as much as he can of the good of the
world. The law of self-preservation plays its part in this as in other
phases of life, and, when the laboring class saw their interest jeopar-
dized by the powerful combinations of capital arrayed against them, it
was but natural and proper that they, too, should combine in order that
the battle might be waged in a fair and equal way. The transition
from the old to the new is not yet over, for it is a radical one. Cap-
ital and labor are not yet sure of their positions. This uncertainty
and the doubtfulness of their respective rights has led to the mass
of litigation between employer and employee on this and kindred topics.
On the subject chosen for this article, if an exhaustive treatment
were attempted, volumes might be written. It is my plan, therefore,
to devote some few words to what I understand to be embraced with-
in the subject, and then treat more or less in detail of one phase of
that subject.
"How far is a person protected by the courts in the exercise of
his vocation otherwise than by remedies for actual or threatened
breaches of contract or violence?" The first word that requires any
discussion at all is the word "vocation." It seems to me that "voca-
tion" implies "occupation" or "employment" rather than "business"
or "employing," and necessarily, then, the subject is meant to refer
to injuries to employees, and it will be so treated. All cases involving
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contract rights are expressly excluded; so discussion will be limited
to those employments which are terminable at the will of either party.
Every form of violence, actual or threatened, including intimidation,
I take it, are also outside the scope of this article. This, it seems
to me, leaves as proper topic to be considered under this subject, slan-
der, libel, boycott and inducing an employer to discharge a workman
by threats to quit or actually quitting their employment by one or more
workmen. The law relating to the subjects of slander and libel is
virtually the same with reference to this topic as it is to other branches
of the law, and I do not mean to treat of it here. Boycotts of laborers
are rarely resorted to; so I shall not consider them. This leaves as my
subject, "How far is a person protected in the exercise of his vocation
by the courts by remedies for the action of a workman or combination
of workmen in procuring his discharge or preventing his employment
by threatening to leave their employer's service unless such person
is discharged or refused employment?"
On this question there are a great many decisions, and they are
by no means in harmony. A moment's reflection will show that courts
in rendering decisions not only strive to do justice between the par-
ticular litigants, but, realizing that their findings form part of the law
governing the future conduct of the community at large, allow them-
selves to be guided in their decisions by certain general and funda-
mental principles which law and tradition have evolved as being most
conducive to the welfare and happiness of the public in common.
These principles comprise what is usually known as "public policy,"
which might be said to be synonymous with the term, "the greater
good for the greater number." If the conflicting decisions pertaining
to our subject are closely scrutinized, it will be seen that all are ren-
dered with these policies, or, to speak more accurately, these phases
of public policy in mind. So in one case we see the court zealously
guarding the rights of the individual, while in another the right of
free competition is given first importance and any injuries suffered
by its exercise held to be justified. In other cases, the judge gives
first thought to freedom of will, holding that any action which en-
thralls the will is unlawful per se. In numerous instances, the pres-
ence in the mind of the judge of these principles seems not to be so
evident, but he seems to be endeavoring to reconcile the decisions and
follow the weight of authority. On analysis of the conflict, however,
it appears that the difference is more apparent than real. It is a
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difference of degree only-a diversity of opinion as to the relative im-
portance of the various considerations named above. These principles
will be again referred to throughout the course of this article.
The administration of law might be said to be a determination
of rights and a redress of the violation of those rights, and it is ob-
vious that the greater part of the time of the courts is devoted to
determining the rights of the litigants; for, once the rights are settled.
the remedy generally is granted as of course. Once we have settled
upon the rights of the parties involved, the answer to our question will
be readily found. So this article is of rights.
Bouvier defines rights as "well-founded claims of moral beings
upon one another." He classifies rights as "absolute" and "qualified."
Absolute rights are also known as "natural" or "inherent" rights; and
qualified rights are sometimes called "relative," "correlative," or "com-
mon" rights. Absolute rights are those which inhere in our frame of
government and are expressly guaranteed by our constitution, such as
the right to liberty of motion, the right of contract and the incidents
of ownership of material property. Because our social and business
relations are so complicated, it follows that by far the greater num-
ber of our rights are relative-are those which can only be exercised
in relations with other people, and which must, therefore, necessarily
be exercised with due regard to similar and equal rights in others. It
is evident, however, that it is inevitable that these equal rights should
frequently clash, and it is here that the considerations of the above
mentioned principles of public policy come into play in determining
which of the two equal rights shall prevail.
When we speak of a right or wrong we generally think of the
person possessing such right or suffering such wrong, rather than of
the person having the correlative duty or committing the correlative
wrongful act. Is there any difference from the standpoint of damage
suffered by th& injured person, whether such wrong be done in pur-
suance of a legitimate or a malicious propose?1 It seems to me that
any violation of a right, no matter what the circumstances, is a wrong.
This does not mean, however, that every such wrong is actionable,
for in many cases other considerations are present which excuse or
justify the infliction of damage. Any damage resulting from the exer-
cise of an absolute right is always held justified on the theory that it
is more essential to the public weal that such right be unlimited than
2 Allen v. Flood, A. C. 1898, 1.
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that the injuries inflicted in rare cases be redressed. It is in relation
to the exercise of qualified rights that justification is generally spoken
of. Among these qualified rights is now generally recognized the right
of which we are treating-the right to the exercise of one's trade or
calling.2
The courts quite unanimously hold that a single individual may
procure the discharge of a fellow workman without incurring liability,
no matter what the actor's motive, and whether he is carrying out a
threat or simply leaving without informing his employer of the reasons
for his conduct.3 The right to leave is equal to the right to stay. If
there is a detriment to one individual, there is a corresponding bene-
fit to trade in general in allowing uncurbed, legitimate competition.
If there is a wrong, there is a justification. The importance of free
competition is considered as of controlling weight and the decisions
rendered in accordance therewith.
We come next in our plan as set forth in the appended outline to
a consideration of the legality of a combination of employes to pro-
cure the discharge of a fellow-workman.. This is generally done by
a threat to quit work in a body, or, if this does not prove successful,
then by an actual suspension of service-what is commonaly called a
"strike." A strike may be said to be a refusal on the part of employees
to work for their employer unless some demand is complied with. It
was thought in England at one time that all combinations were unlaw-
ful. But it was early recognized in this country that workmen had
the right to combine to use all legitimate means for their moral, social,
educational, and vocational advancement. And it has been said that
what one may legally do, a number may combine to do. 4 This has
been settled by statute as the law of England. This proposition is
undoubtedly true so long as the result produced is simply the sum
total of the individual acts of the members. But, it is submitted, not
only does the strength of the organization increase in multiple pro-
portion to the members, but an entirely new element is present to be
dealt with.
When a single worker threatens to quit, the employer may be
forced to choose between two evils, but whichever course he pursues,
it is plain that he has considered such course to be to the best of his
2 Gray v. Bldg. Trades Council, 63 L. R. A. 753.
3 Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067; Kemp v. Division
No. 241, 255 111. 213; Carter v. Oster, 134 Mo. App. 146.
4 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Lbr. Assn., 21 L. R. A. 337.
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interests. His mind has been free. But when a large number of his
workmen combine and threaten to leave or actually leave his service,
his realization of the financial and business loss that will be entailed
upon such action is enough to deprive him of his will in the matter
and to practically force him to submit to the will of others, when the
will of such others is contrary to his own. This is the plainest kind
of duress in fact, and here is a result in direct violation of the policy
of the courts to preserve liberty of mind as of body. Which shall
prevail, the policy of prohibiting the enthralling of the will or the
policy of encouraging free competition?
When two such leading policies clashed, the courts looked about
them to find, so to speak, some rules of the game. In what other cases
had constraint of the mind or body been permitted or practiced by
the law. Why, clearly in those cases where the general benefit result-
ing to the public at large had been enough to outweigh the detriment
suffered to a particular individual or group of individuals; as the
restraint of physical liberty when such physical liberty is a menace
to society, or constraint of the will in cases where courts decree
specific performance or issue restraining orders. And so in this way
arose the doctrine of justification as applied in considering the legality
of strikes. It is not a new doctrine. It pervades the whole theory
of the law. As was intimated above, the courts often apply it with-
out recognizing it as such. In some particular subjects, such as
slander, libel, self-defense, and others, it is given special attention.
The courts, pursuing this principle to its logical conclusion, evolved
the doctrine that a labor union might call a strike of all its members
working for a certain employer or in a certain shop, so long as the
primary purpose was to benefit the strikers by strengthening the union
so that it might be better able to cope with the combinations of capital
in its struggle for better working conditions, increased pay, and
shorter hours. And so it has been held that, if the primary purpose is
to benefit the members, then it matters not that there be present the
secondary intent to injure by their action; and if the primary con-
sideration be the malicious injury to another, then no expectation of
gain or benefit will excuse or justify their action.
But the gain, the struggle for which will furnish sufficient justi-
fication, must not be a trivial, frivolous, or fancied gain, but a sub-
stantial gain, such a one as the law will recognize. In the leading case
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of DeMinico v. Craig, I it was held that a strike is not justified which
seeks to procure the discharge of a foreman who has made himself
obnoxious solely by his efforts to enforce the rules of the shop. In
that case, Judge Loring, in delivering the opinion of the court, said,
"One who betters his condition only by escaping from what he merely
dislikes, and by securing what he likes, does not better his condition
within the meaning of those words in the rule that employees can
strike to better their condition."
However, it has been quite universally held that ends which may
legitimately be sought by strikes are the employing of only skilled
workmen, the discharge of incompetent and careless workmen, the
shortening of hours of labor, and the bettering of sanitary or work-
ing conditions. Not only must the primary purpose of the strike be
to benefit the members, but the benefit must be such as will flow
directly and immediately from their action. On these grounds, a
strike where there was no dispute between employer and employees,
but which was simply a "sympathetic" strike, was declared unjusti-
fied, the court holding that the benefit expected (the final strengthen-
ing of the organization), was too remote and indirect to excuse the
injury inflicted.$
On the question of whether or not a strike is justified, which has
as its sole purpose the discharge of a non-union employee in order
that the organization may be strengthened, there is a conflict of
authorities, and, I believe, this is the only subject upon which there is
such a conflict. However, here again, I think it is rather a difference
of opinion as to the relative importance of the rights involved than as
to what those rights are. In the leading Massachusetts case of Berry
v Donovan,7 it was held that the purpose of strengthening itself in
future contests with the employer would not justify a labor union in
striking to procure the discharge of a non-union workman. However,
in this case, the non-union employee was under contract. In Plant v.
Woods,' another leading case from Massachusetts, the same decision
was given, but the authority of this case is weakened by the vigorous
dissent of Chief Justice Holmes, and by the fact that there was intimi-
dation and force involved.
The New York Court of Appeals, in a very lucid opinion by
5 De Minico v. Craig, 217 Mass. 593; 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1048.
6 Pickett v. Walsh, supra.
788 Mass. 353; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899.
8 176 Mass. 492; 51 L. R. A. 339.
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Chief Justice Parker held, in the case of National Protective Associa-
tion of Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumning,' that it was essential
to the interests of the working class to declare a strike lawful which
had for its purpose the discharge of an employee who was not a mem-
ber of the union. This decision seems to be supported not only by
the weight of authority, but by the better reasoning. For it is mere
mockery to grant to laborers the right to combine for the purpose of
bettering their condition and then deny them the use of their prin-
cipal weapon of offense. Without the right to refuse to work with
non-union men, organized labor is helpless before the encroachments
or combination and capital.
Before closing this article, I feel it is necessary to say a few
words on the subject of "threats." A good many of the decisions
infer that the right of the employee to quit whenever he wishes be-
comes actionable when exercised in the form of a threat to leave
unless another employee is discharged. Under the theory of the law
as set down in this treatise, this distinction is clearly both erroneous
and useless. What it is lawful to do, it surely is lawful to threaten
to do.10 The doctrine of justification should furnish the sole basis
for determining the lawfulness of such actiofis, for it is an eminently
fair one. It furnishes an incentive to free competition, generous im-
pulses, and fair play, and tends to discourage malice and ill-will
between employer and employee, and between fellow-employees.
In order to get a clearer conception of the subject as a whole,
it may perhaps be well to add a brief summary. I have thought it
more advisable to set down what, it seemed to me, the leading deci-
sions have settled as the law, rather than a detailed account of those
decisions themselves. It seems to be firmly established that a person,
acting singly, is never liable for procuring the discharge of another
not under contract. Unions are universally considered lawful, and
are allowed to strike when their primary purpose is to secure to them-
selves a substantial benefit. This benefit must be the natural and
direct result of their action. The better authority holds that the
strengthening of the union resulting from refusing to work with non-
union men is a justifiable, lawful purpose.
Ggo. L. ST4MMLVR.
9170 N. Y. 315; 58 L. R. A. 135.10 Longshore Prntg. & Pub. Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 28 L. R. A. 464.
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